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Introduction
Admittedly, at first glance, Kant’s conception of the subject matter of 
traditional metaphysics would appear to have nothing in common with the 
subject matter of metaphysics at work in contemporary analytic philosophy. 
For according to Kant traditional metaphysics is ultimately concerned with 
God, freedom, and the immortality of the soul, whereas many recent analytic
metaphysicians express little interest in these topics, instead conceiving of 
(much of) their subject matter in terms of what they call grounding, which is 
often characterized as a special kind of asymmetrical, transitive, irreflexive 
dependence relation that is applicable to a wide range of subject matters.1 A 
first main claim I argue for in this paper is that appearances are misleading 
in this case since both Kant and contemporary metaphysicians are in fact 
focused on a similar, perhaps even the very same, kind of relation whose 
nature and implications they are both attempting to describe.
If Kant and contemporary metaphysicians agree about the basic 
subject matter of metaphysics, it is tempting to ask what real progress 
metaphysics has made since the time of Kant. The enormous expenditure of 
intellectual effort over the past several decades has undoubtedly been 
extremely useful. Contemporary metaphysicians have helped us to 
understand more clearly the nature of modality as well as the significance of 
an extramodal dimension to a wide range of issues, and the distinctions they
have drawn along the way both sharpen our focus and allow us to specify in 
greater detail what our metaphysical options are. If there are more options 
than we had seen before, then clearly we have made progress, and if we can
also see the various options more clearly, then that is even more progress. 
The second main claim I want to argue for is that the contemporary focus on
grounding allows us to make progress in understanding Kant insofar as it can
be used to bring much-needed clarity to what Kant means when he refers to 
a condition.2 Given how central that notion is to Kant’s entire project, 
attaining clarity about it would be quite useful for better understanding 
Kant’s position. And one might think that making progress in understanding 
Kant is an important kind of progress as well.
At the same time, it would be premature to infer that the progress 
contemporary metaphysicians have made could justify one in finally leaving 
Kant behind as a once useful, but now thoroughly superseded figure of 
merely antiquarian interest. For Kant’s criticisms of the pretensions of 
dogmatic metaphysics have still not been sufficiently appreciated among 
practitioners of metaphysics today along at least two dimensions. First, 
though Kant conceives of philosophy at a high level of generality, his mode 
of argument on many especially important issues is not “short”, but rather 
“long”.3 That is, in these cases he does not start by defining the weight-
bearing concepts in the most general of terms and then put them to use in 
“short” arguments that would immediately support his most general claims. 
Instead, he consistently begins by analyzing specific issues, attending to 
what is unique to them, and then uses the details that come to light to 
construct “long” arguments for specific claims. It is only when those specific 
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issues are all viewed together that he can consider whether they involve any
general features that could justify more general conclusions. For example, 
Kant bases his main arguments for Transcendental Idealism (in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic and the Antinomy of Pure Reason) not on a generic
notion of representation, but rather on features that are specific to the 
sensible intuitions we happen to have, namely space and time.4 And it is only
on the basis of these specific issues that he can then make claims about 
what we can and cannot cognize in general. The method that Kant uses in 
developing his own philosophy thus recommends that one not argue solely 
at the most generic level, without first determining that all relevant 
particular instances support the general claims, nor that one either 
concentrate on one specific topic to the exclusion of others or focus only on 
several specific topics without also attending to the general issues of which 
they are instances. What his practice recommends is instead a 
comprehensive perspective that is at once specific and general, but where 
the more specific receives methodological priority over the more general.
Second, precisely because Kant lived through an extended period of 
contentious metaphysical debate that many viewed as unproductive or even 
scandalous, he came to see the value of stepping back from first-order 
metaphysical claims to identify the conditions of the possibility of 
establishing substantive cognition of the objects of traditional metaphysics 
and to analyze the nature and scope of our different cognitive faculties, such
as sensibility, understanding, and reason so as to determine whether they 
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can meet the requisite conditions. These reflections led Kant to be attentive 
to the difference between the explanatory demands that motivate a 
complete metaphysical account of the world, and the cognitive limitations 
that would prevent human beings from ever being able to satisfy those 
demands in full. That is, even if we have a clear sense of what an exhaustive 
explanation of the world would be like, it does not follow that we could ever 
adequately support such an explanation. As a result, Kant comes to the 
conclusion that claims concerning certain metaphysical objects outstrip our 
capacity to cognize them. 
Now many contemporary metaphysicians have certainly followed Kant 
in stepping back from first-order metaphysical claims to reflect on the nature
of the claims that philosophers (including metaphysicians) make.5 However, 
some seem at times not to have reflected sufficiently on whether we have 
substantive reason to assert the actuality of at least some of the 
metaphysical possibilities whose conceptual space they have devoted their 
time to exploring. The issue of concern is not so much modal epistemology in
general, as it is that certain claims involving grounding relations are asserted
as basic self-evident principles, or, to put it in Kantian terms, as analytic 
truths, when they are in fact synthetic and, what’s more, lack sufficient 
justification. This is all the more problematic when these claims concern the 
objects of traditional metaphysics, which are of perennial concern to human 
beings. The result is a metaphysical practice that can seem to be as 
dogmatic as the views held by Kant’s immediate predecessors. The third 
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main claim I argue for is that even if contemporary metaphysicians have 
made significant progress in many areas and on many topics, they may not 
have made so much progress that there is nothing of importance left in Kant 
from which they could learn.
In the first section of this paper, I describe (1) how Kant’s detailed 
critical analyses of the arguments of traditional metaphysics are instances of
long rather than short arguments by showing how each one makes crucial 
use of a specific notion (composition, causation, and representation) that 
involves an asymmetrical metaphysical dependence relation, and (2) how 
these analyses can be generalized in a way that illustrates how our cognitive
limitations make it impossible to satisfy reason’s demands for complete 
explanation, demands that find expression in the conclusions of the 
arguments of traditional metaphysics. In the second section, I describe some
of the motivations for introducing the notion of grounding that is at the heart
of current debates in contemporary metaphysics, and point to some of its 
defining characteristics. Specifically, I describe some of the contexts in which
grounding is often thought to be present, note the features that are typically 
(though not universally) thought constitutive of it–its asymmetry, transitivity,
irreflexivity, and direction of dependence–and consider ways in which these 
claims can be called into question. In the third section, I undertake an 
extremely abbreviated comparison and contrast of Kant’s perspective on 
metaphysics and central features of contemporary discussions of grounding 
relations, so as to support the three main claims just mentioned. In this way, 
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I aim to offer a sense of how contemporary metaphysics has made progress 
in some respects, while still allowing for room for more progress in others, 
especially insofar as Kant has important insights into the fundamental limits 
of our metaphysical practices.
1. Kant on the extension of cognition in metaphysics
In the Critique of Pure Reason’s Transcendental Dialectic, Kant 
discusses the claims of traditional metaphysics in the hopes of determining 
whether such claims could ever amount to synthetic a priori cognition. In the 
Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic Kant provides an 
analysis of how sensibility and the understanding contribute to satisfying two
important conditions on cognition (the givenness condition and the thought 
condition). Specifically, through sensible intuition objects can be given and 
through discursive concepts objects can be thought. Accordingly, if an object
is both given and thought through these representations, then we can have a
cognition of it, since a cognition, for Kant, involves an awareness of an object
(meeting the givenness condition) as having some positive general features 
(meeting the thought condition).6 In the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant then 
investigates whether reason can extend our cognition to objects that are not 
given immediately in intuition. That is, even if I do not immediately perceive 
an object, one might think that reason could nonetheless infer its existence 
from objects that are immediately given. Accordingly, insofar as traditional 
metaphysics lays claim to cognition of objects that are not immediately 
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given, the question the Dialectic attempts to answer is whether reason, 
through its inferences, can extend our cognition in the field of metaphysics 
to objects that are not given through our senses. 
Now Kant takes traditional metaphysicians to have given a positive 
answer to this question insofar as they offer arguments concerning a wide 
range of objects not immediately given to sense, including God, the world, 
and the soul. For example, they often think that one can infer from the 
existence of representations to the existence of the soul, where the soul is 
understood as a simple immaterial substance, for it can seem that one needs
something to serve as the subject of those representations, something that 
is responsible for thinking them. Often, they also think it appropriate to infer 
from the existence of contingent objects in the world to the existence of God 
as a necessary cause of such objects, since it can seem that the existence of 
something contingent requires a cause that is itself not contingent. Finally, 
some also find irresistible the move from the existence of a composite (e.g., 
the world) to the existence of the simples that must compose it, for it can 
seem that a whole cannot exist without ultimate parts.7 In short, traditional 
metaphysicians often think that even though we do not directly experience 
the existence of the soul, God, or simples, one can still feel warranted in 
inferring the existence of such entities, because something that we do 
experience depends on them and they seem to explain something that 
stands in need of explanation.8
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Now Kant’s main goal in the Transcendental Dialectic is to show that 
these inferences are not in fact capable of delivering cognition of the objects 
of traditional metaphysics and thus that reason cannot extend our cognition 
by means of them. For he argues that the conclusion does not in fact follow 
in each case, at least not without significant qualification, because each 
inference involves some illegitimate step. To support this contention, Kant 
offers a complex diagnosis of the fallacious step and of what the illusion is 
that naturally and inevitably tempts one into making it. At the same time, 
Kant’s intent is not purely negative in the Dialectic, for he agrees with 
traditional metaphysicians that each of these inferences starts with 
something that cannot stand on its own and that therefore calls out in some 
way for explanation. Thus he grants that representations cannot in fact float 
free of mental subjects, even if it does not follow that we can cognize the 
mental subject in question as a simple immaterial substance. What’s more, 
he himself insists that a contingent event requires a cause involving 
necessity, even if that cause might not be God (as traditional understood). 
Finally, he readily acknowledges that a composite entity really does depend 
on its parts, even if those parts might not be simple, as the argument 
contends. Thus, whatever conclusions one might legitimately draw from the 
arguments put forward by traditional metaphysicians, they fall short of the 
kind of specific, positive claims that such metaphysicians have in mind when 
asserting cognition of the soul (as a simple immaterial substance), God (as 
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an ens realissimum) or freedom (as an uncaused cause of a series of 
appearances).9 
To understand in more detail Kant’s complex attitude toward the 
claims of traditional metaphysics, it is useful to consider his discussion of the
arguments that support these claims. For the sake of brevity, I discuss only 
the Second and Third Antinomies and the First Paralogism, given that 
analogous considerations pertain to Kant’s treatment of the remaining 
arguments in the Dialectic. The Second Antinomy concerns the existence of 
simples, with the Thesis arguing that simple parts must exist and the 
Antithesis arguing against the existence of simples. The argument in favor of
simples is based on two main ideas: first, that a whole necessarily depends 
on its parts and second, that if one removes all composition, the parts that 
remain must be simple. The argument against simples is based on the 
infinite divisibility of space, for if a simple entity is spatially extended (and an
object we could experience), then it must be divisible and thus cannot be 
simple. 
Now it is striking that both arguments turn, either explicitly or 
implicitly, on composition relations. The Thesis argument depends on 
composition explicitly because it must be possible to remove all composition 
from a composite given that composition is a merely accidental relation 
between parts and because the simples are supposed to compose the whole.
The Antithesis argument also turns on composition, though more implicitly, 
by presupposing that because space itself is infinitely divisible, whatever 
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occupies space must also be infinitely divisible into the parts that compose 
it. And in both arguments, though he does not advertise it at all, Kant 
understands the composition relation as an asymmetrical, transitive 
metaphysical dependence relation. For the whole depends on its proper 
parts, without those parts in turn depending on the whole, and if these parts 
themselves have further parts, then those further parts are parts of the 
original whole as well.
Since Kant accepts this account of composition and acknowledges that 
a spatially extended object must depend on the parts that compose it, how 
does he avoid the contradiction between the conclusions of the Thesis and 
Antithesis arguments? Kant’s resolution of the Second Antinomy is naturally 
quite complicated, as it involves Transcendental Idealism among much else, 
but for current purposes, two points are crucial. First, at a certain level of 
generality, the conflict between the Thesis and Antithesis positions is about 
whether the series of composition relations that a whole involves is finite or 
infinite. If the series of division into parts terminates at some point, then it 
must do so with something that is simple (the Thesis), whereas if it does not,
then, since composition goes all the way down, the whole must be infinitely 
divisible (the Antithesis). Second, Kant maintains that given our cognitive 
limitations, we cannot cognize whether the series of composition relations is 
finite or infinite. We cannot cognize it as infinite, because we can only ever 
cognize a finite number of divisions and thus a finite number of parts. But we
cannot cognize it as finite either, because whatever finite parts are given to 
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us at any particular moment in time must be in space and since space is 
infinitely divisible, whatever parts one cognizes at a particular moment in 
time must be divisible as well. Thus with respect to no particular part could 
we ever say that we are cognizing the terminal member.10 (Note that it does 
not follow from this argument that there cannot be simples, but only that if 
there are, we cannot cognize them. Transcendental Idealism thus does figure
into the resolution in a central way.) Therefore, we cannot cognize what is 
asserted by either the Thesis or the Antithesis, which resolves the conflict 
between them and prevents us from having the kind of metaphysical 
cognition that the traditional metaphysician claims to be able to support.
The structure of the Third Antinomy is similar to that of the Second. Its 
Thesis asserts, while its Antithesis denies freedom. The argument in favor of 
the Thesis turns on the impossibility of causal determinism being able to 
provide a truly sufficient explanation, while the argument in favor of the 
Antithesis turns on the impossibility of a free, or uncaused cause taking 
place in time, since every event in time must be caused to happen when it 
does and thus cannot be uncaused.11 Both arguments clearly turn on 
features of causality, which Kant understands, again without explicitly noting
or arguing for it, as an asymmetrical, transitive metaphysical dependence 
relation. For an effect depends on its cause, without the cause depending on 
the effect, and, as Kant understands it, if a causes b and b causes c, then a 
causes c. The resolution of the Third Antinomy is also similar to that of the 
Second. The conflict between the Thesis and the Antithesis is about whether 
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the series of causes that bring an event about is finite, which would entail 
freedom (Thesis), or infinite, which would entail determinism (Antithesis). 
The resolution affirms the truth of determinism, but only if it is restricted to 
what we can cognize, and therefore allows for the possibility of freedom, but 
only among objects that we cannot cognize. Without such an 
acknowledgement of the limitations of our cognition, determinism would 
apply to everything and freedom would be impossible. With such an 
acknowledgment of humility, we cannot have cognition of freedom and thus 
cannot have metaphysical cognition in this particular instance.
The Paralogisms are both similar to and different from the Antinomies. 
They differ in their subject matter—objects of inner sense vs. objects of outer
sense —in their formal structure—categorical syllogisms for an unopposed 
dogmatic claim vs. pairs of arguments for contradictory claims based on the 
assumption of Transcendental Realism—and in the notion that the argument 
depends on—composition and causality vs. thinking/representing. However, 
much like those presented in the Antinomies, the arguments discussed in the
Paralogisms make crucial use of a particular relation, namely thinking or 
representing, that Kant, without explicitly noting it, takes to be an 
asymmetrical metaphysical dependence relation.12 For Kant holds, as does 
the rational psychologist, that all representations depend on a mental 
subject that thinks them, but also that a mental subject does not in turn 
depend on its representations. And the arguments of the Paralogisms turn on
precisely this notion, since they attempt to infer from some feature of 
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representations—their accidentality and unity—to some feature of the I—its 
substantiality and simplicity—on the basis of what is required for a 
representation to be adequately supported. They are also similar, at least in 
broad outline, with respect to their resolution. For Kant wants to object that 
we cannot in fact cognize the features of the soul that the paralogistic 
arguments attribute to it. For all we know, the mental subject, or I, that 
thinks representations is an accident of a more fundamental substance, or is 
not in fact a simple thing, but a collection of things, and without an intuition 
of the I that could decide the matter, the arguments offered in support of 
them cannot exclude the scenarios that would need to be excluded. Thus, as 
in the case of the Second and Third Antinomies, our cognitive limitations 
prevent us from extending our cognition to the objects of traditional 
metaphysics since they are not given immediately in intuition and the 
inferences that would take us to them trade on fallacy and illusion.
As insightful as Kant’s critical analyses of these metaphysical 
arguments might be, he does not leave it at that. In addition, he steps back 
from the details of each case and looks to see what general features they 
might have in common and what might unify them. One point he notes is 
that all of these arguments make use of a real conditioning relation between 
a condition and what is conditioned by it.13 Thus, he calls parts conditions of 
the whole that they compose, a cause the condition of its effect, and the I 
that thinks a condition of its representations.14 Second, Kant notes that each 
argument starts with some conditioned feature, and then draws on these 
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conditioning relations to infer to something unconditioned, that is, something
that is not conditioned in the way in which the conditioned items are. In the 
case of the Paralogisms, the unconditioned is the soul (as a simple 
immaterial substance), since there is nothing prior to the I think on which it 
depends to think its representations. In the case of the Antinomies, the 
unconditioned could be the terminal member of the series, that is, simples 
and freedom, since a simple is not conditioned with respect to its 
composition and a free action is not caused to act in the way that it does. 
But note that Kant thinks that the unconditioned could also be the infinite 
series of conditions itself, that is the infinite whole of parts and causes, since 
such a whole contains all relevant conditions and thus cannot leave out any 
further conditions that could condition it.
That Kant introduces this notion of a condition and notes that all of 
these arguments infer to something unconditioned has systematic 
importance for his larger philosophical project. For it allows him not only to 
characterize reason as a spontaneous faculty that seeks the totality of 
conditions for what is conditioned, and thus the unconditioned, but also to 
see that in doing so reason demands complete explanations, that is, 
explanations that include everything which is part of an explanation and that
terminate with something that admits of no further explanation. Reason can 
be satisfied with nothing less. At the same time, as Kant’s analysis of the 
arguments of traditional metaphysics reveals, what we can in principle 
cognize falls short of reason’s demands. That is, reason demands a complete
14
explanation, and because reason is the highest, most authoritative faculty 
we have, we would be dissatisfied with anything that could not withstand its 
criticisms.15 At the same time, the fact that reason demands something does 
not entail that we are also able to satisfy them. It turns out that our cognition
is limited to whatever is given in space and time, which is always 
conditioned, and for that reason our (theoretical) cognition necessarily falls 
short of what reason demands, namely cognition of what is unconditioned.
2. Grounding
After the rise and fall of logical positivism, which used verificationist 
principles to dismiss metaphysical claims as meaningless, and after the 
ascent and inevitable decline of Quine’s taste for ontologically sparse desert 
landscapes, which allowed only an extreme nominalist ontology, analytic 
metaphysicians reasserted themselves in a more robust way by insisting on 
the importance of modal claims, which were typically cashed out in terms of 
possible worlds and made use of notions such as supervenience. As useful as
these modal notions proved to be in certain contexts, after a while they 
came to be thought of as insufficient to characterize some important 
metaphysical issues, which find expression in locutions such as because of, 
in virtue of, determines, makes up, gives rise to, generates, etc. For 
example, we are inclined to say that an action is loved by the gods in virtue 
of being pious, that glass is fragile because of the arrangement of the 
molecules that make it up, that if an act is wrong, it must be due to some 
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feature it has, that being in a certain brain state gives rise to or generates a 
certain mental state, etc. While one might try to explain these claims in 
modal terms, success has been elusive, in part because supervenience is a 
reflexive and non-symmetric relation, while the relations these locutions 
express are irreflexive and asymmetrical. The clearest problem case would 
be one that relates two necessary truths, where the one depends on the 
other for its truth. For example, (A or ~A or B) is true because (A or ~A) is 
true. Or if the gods necessarily love pious actions, then what the gods love 
and what is pious will be coextensive in all possible worlds. As a result, 
modal terms cannot capture the fact that the gods love pious actions 
because they are pious. As soon as it became clear that modal terms could 
not capture this difference, it became necessary to look to other resources, 
and this is one important source of interest in the relation that has come to 
be called grounding in the literature (though there are other terminological 
proposals, such as “building”).16
Much attention has been devoted over the past couple decades to 
analyzing and describing the precise features of grounding. It is generally 
agreed that grounding is an asymmetrical dependence relation, since one 
thing, what is grounded, depends in some way on another, the ground, 
without the other in turn depending on it. How this notion of dependence is 
to be understood is still a matter of debate. If it is not taken as a primitive, it 
is sometimes thought to involve determination. Typically, though not always,
grounding is also thought to be transitive and irreflexive, so that grounding is
16
often taken to be a strict ordering relation. Further, grounding is most often 
characterized as explanatory and as hyperintensional. That is, it is generally 
agreed that a ground must explain, at least in part, what is grounded by it by
using extra-modal terms.
Though vigorous debate about the existence and precise features of 
the grounding relation continues unabated, two issues seem to be 
particularly important in the present context, one concerning the nature and 
direction of dependence that grounding involves, the other concerning the 
unity of grounding. To see what is at issue with respect to the nature and 
direction of dependence, it can be useful to consider the relations that obtain
between proper parts and a whole. It is standard to define proper part-whole 
relations as being irreflexive, asymmetrical, and transitive. Since, as we have
seen, grounding relations also have these features, the part-whole relation 
satisfies several conditions that are usually viewed as necessary for a 
grounding relation. But note that simply specifying the proper part-whole 
relations among various entities does not decide what depends on what. For 
one could maintain that the whole depends on its parts, as the pluralist 
maintains, but one might instead maintain that the parts depend on the 
whole, as the monist maintains.17 As a result, the notion of an asymmetrical 
dependence that is contained in that of grounding would seem to be what is 
required to distinguish these two options. Those part-whole relations in which
the direction of the dependence is settled as the pluralist maintains would 
view composition as the relevant grounding relation, while those part-whole 
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relations in which the direction is settled as the monist would have it, would 
view partitioning as the relevant grounding relation.
Now, skeptics of grounding might counter that, at least as far as part-
whole relations are concerned, one can distinguish between the positions of 
the monists and the pluralists without invoking distinct grounding relations, 
namely by appealing to the fundamental and the derivative.18 For example, a
defender of pluralism might assert that the parts are fundamental and that 
the whole is derivative (or non-fundamental), just as the monist might claim 
that the whole is fundamental and the parts derivative. That is, rather than 
building dependence into a strictly ordered part-whole relation so that it then
satisfies the conditions of grounding, one can dispense with the dependence 
relation, and thus with grounding as well, by introducing a new primitive, 
fundamentality. And if this kind of move can be generalized, one could deny 
the existence of all grounding relations. In this way, one can, it seems, be a 
skeptic about grounding, but still be able to explain the “in virtue of” claims 
that initially motivated the introduction of the grounding relation.
A second issue that has been discussed in some detail concerns the 
unity of grounding. Advocates of grounding think that grounding relations 
are relevant to a wide range of topics (physical composition, ethical 
voluntarism, mental reductionism, metaphysical naturalism). Given this rich 
diversity, it is natural to ask how these different grounding relations are 
related to each other. One might think that they are all simply distinct 
notions: composition is distinct from determination, which is distinct from 
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generation, and so on. On this construal, grounding1 is distinct from 
grounding2, which is distinct from grounding3, etc. However, it is quite 
natural to think that some more general Grounding relation unifies the 
different instances. Yet there are different ways in which one might describe 
the unity of such instances. Perhaps Grounding is the genus, and grounding1,
grounding2, and grounding3 are species thereof, just as polar, grizzly, and 
brown are different species of bear. But perhaps Grounding is a 
determinable, and grounding1, grounding2, and grounding3 are determinates 
thereof, just as red, yellow, and blue are determinate colors. Either way, on 
this view, the different particular instances of grounding have something 
significant in common, namely some close relation to Grounding, which in 
some way unifies the different instances.  
But again, one might be skeptical about Grounding (if not about 
grounding). What is the point of positing Grounding in addition to grounding1,
grounding2, and grounding3? What distinct explanatory work could Grounding
accomplish? If one accepts the genus-species account of the Grounding-
groundingx relation, the genus might be a useful device for notational 
purposes or for our mental economy, but it could seem to do no explanatory 
work, leaving one with no reason to posit it as something distinct from the 
various particular groundingx relations. An analogous point holds if one 
accepts the determinable/determination account of the Grounding-grounding
relation. In short, if the devil is in the details, there seems to be no reason to 
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posit a more generic Grounding relation, since it could not help with any of 
the details.
Though this description of the contemporary discussion of grounding is
highly selective and quite brief, I hope that it is still clear that there is a 
genuine phenomenon—extra-modal dependence or “in virtue of” relations—
that can be seen as central to a wide range of important philosophical topics.
One should also have a clear sense of the defining features of the grounding 
relation, since it is often thought to be an asymmetric, transitive, irreflexive 
metaphysical dependence relation that is hyperintensional and explanatorily 
significant.  At the same time, one ought to be able to appreciate that 
various aspects of this relation could be called into question on grounds that 
seem, at least prima facie, to be worth taking seriously. Contemporary 
analytic metaphysicians are grappling with serious issues and have real work
ahead of them.
3. Comparison and Contrast
Now that we have some sense of Kant’s conception of traditional 
metaphysics and of analytic metaphysicians’ conception of the grounding 
relation, we can compare and contrast the two so as to address the three 
main claims mentioned above and see what real progress is possible. As we 
have seen, though Kant holds that the proper subject matter of traditional 
metaphysics is God, the soul, and freedom, he also maintains that several 
different relations, such as composition, causality, and representation, are 
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the argumentative vehicles that traditional metaphysicians use to attempt to
infer to the existence of God, the soul, and freedom. As necessary means to 
necessary ends, these three relations are crucial to traditional metaphysics. 
Since they are all asymmetrical metaphysical dependence relations that are 
explanatory in character, just as grounding relations are, they are at least 
similar in several important respects to the kind of relation that 
contemporary metaphysicians are interested in. 
This is not to say that there are no differences. For example, Kant and 
contemporary metaphysicians disagree about whether causation is an 
instance of grounding. However, at least some of this difference may derive 
from their differing analyses of causation, since Kant takes causation to be 
an asymmetrical, irreflexive, and transitive metaphysical dependence 
relation, whereas many contemporary philosophers adopt other accounts, 
such as Humean regularity theories or counterfactual views.19 Relatedly, one 
might take Kant to be challenging the asymmetry condition on grounding 
relations since he views mutual interaction as a symmetrical relation. But 
insofar as mutual interaction involves two asymmetrical causal bonds that 
involve substances determining each other’s states, we have only the 
appearance of a conflict, and not a genuine disagreement.20 Similarly, Kant’s 
interest in representation as a conditioning relation does not overlap 
perfectly with what is discussed in contemporary philosophy of mind, but this
reflects more an interest in different philosophical issues within the 
philosophy of mind rather than a fundamental conflict.21 In sum, Kant and 
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contemporary analytic metaphysicians may offer different analyses in 
particular cases, but these differences are best understood as internecine 
disputes among fellow metaphysicians rather than calling into question their 
shared interest in analyzing and making use of grounding-like relations in 
their metaphysics. Thus, it turns out that, initial appearances to the contrary,
Kant and contemporary metaphysicians are in fact both interested in 
grounding or grounding-like relations. This was my first main claim.
This comparison also allows us to see that one can make good use of 
the detailed analyses that contemporary metaphysicians have provided of 
grounding to make progress in clarifying exactly what a condition in general 
is for Kant. As we have seen above, in the Antinomies and Paralogisms, Kant 
is most immediately interested in particular relations, composition, causality,
and representation, and in showing that certain inferences that involve them 
are fallacious. But as we have seen, Kant does not advertise, or even argue 
for understanding, these particular relations as being asymmetrical 
metaphysical dependence relations. That contemporary metaphysicians 
have focused so intensely on the features that grounding relations have 
clearly helps us to see what features these particular relations have. What’s 
more, Kant’s interest in what they have in common—that they are all 
instances of a generic real conditioning relation—finds expression in what 
can seem to be more incidental contexts (e.g., in prefatory remarks that set 
up a given issue, in statements about syllogisms in logic, and in concluding 
remarks). This fact, combined with Kant’s failure to offer an explicit 
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definition, goes some ways toward explaining why scholars have not 
provided a detailed account of Kant’s conception of a real condition. 
At the same time, since Kant uses the term consistently and for the 
sake of larger, systematic purposes, it would be extremely helpful to have a 
general account of what a real condition is. Here I can offer only a 
preliminary suggestion rather than a full description. On my view, Kant has a 
generic notion of real conditioning that can be defined as an asymmetric 
metaphysical dependence relation that has an explanatory dimension.22 This 
general notion is instantiated in the cases of causation, composition, and 
representation (among several others), despite the fact that they have 
specific differences that make them different instances of a real conditioning 
relation. One particularly important lesson to be learned here is that because
of the special kind of primitive metaphysical dependence relation whose 
explanatory dimension involves the hyperintensionality of the grounding 
relation, Kant’s notion of a real condition cannot be understood either in 
terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, as one might at first think, or in 
purely modal terms. These considerations support the second main claim of 
this paper.
Kant’s account of real conditioning relations and of the ways in which 
they can and cannot be used to draw certain kinds of inferences can also be 
a source of insight in contemporary discussions of grounding. Specifically, 
reflection on Kant’s distinction between the kinds of metaphysical claims one
might be interested in making and the kinds of cognition of which we are 
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capable provides an interesting perspective on the practice of contemporary 
metaphysics. For as we have seen, Kant argues that despite the 
indispensability of the concept of the unconditioned to our cognitive 
practices, the limitations of our cognitive faculties entail that we cannot in 
fact have cognition of the unconditioned, even if we are committed to the 
existence of what is unconditioned. Specifically, since our intuitions are 
limited to spatio-temporal objects that are thoroughly conditioned, we can 
never have the kind of awareness of unconditioned objects that would be 
required to determine what the unconditioned is. Part of the problem, to put 
it in distinctively Kantian terms, is that our concepts of unconditioned objects
lack objective reality. Another part, which is more significant in this context, 
is that we simply do not have the kind of conscious access to what is 
unconditioned that would be needed to support substantive metaphysical 
claims about it. While we can form whatever concepts we want and we can 
make whatever speculative claims we want, it is a mistake to think that this 
puts us in a position to validate specific, positive, determinate claims about 
them.
Though this point cuts against some of the ways in which the concept 
of the unconditioned can be used, it is crucial to note that it need not affect 
all claims about real conditioning, or grounding relations per se, as a radical 
skeptic might maintain. For causation, composition, and representation are 
grounding relations that we can certainly cognize in some contexts; Kant 
famously argues that they are conditions of the possibility of objects of 
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experience.23 Kant’s crucial point, emphasized throughout the 
Transcendental Dialectic, is simply that one cannot immediately infer from 
cases of grounding relations that are perfectly legitimate, namely, cases in 
which one does have the requisite kind of experience of the grounding 
relation (including the ground), to substantive claims in cases in which we do
not. For even if it is legitimate to infer from the existence of what is 
grounded to the existence of its ground (since what is grounded is 
analytically related to its ground), if we lack the requisite experience of that 
ground, we are not in a position to legitimate any positive determinate claim 
about it. That is, we would be justified in inferring that there must be some 
ground, but not that the ground must be identified as one particular object 
with a specific set of properties rather than another. As we have seen, Kant 
explicitly points out that the regress of grounding relations could be finite or 
infinite, and thus we cannot cognize which one obtains even if we were to 
know that one of the two must obtain. More significant yet, he also notes 
that even if we were somehow to know which of these options must be the 
case, we would still have no way of cognizing the objects that constituted the
regress. In this way, Kant argues that one must place significant limitations 
on the practice of metaphysics. 
To see how Kant’s position might bear on a particular issue in 
contemporary metaphysics, it can be useful to consider Jonathan Schaffer’s 
treatment of grounding relations in his important paper, “Monism: The 
Priority of the Whole.” To make his case in favor of monism—the position 
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that the cosmos is fundamental and the whole is prior to its parts—Schaffer 
provides a series of definitions and assumptions that is meant to provide a 
neutral conceptual framework. For example, he defines mereological part-
whole relations and metaphysical priority-posteriority relations, and assumes
that metaphysical priority relations (such as grounding) are not only 
irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive, but also what he calls “well-founded”,
which means that “all priority chains terminate. This assumption provides 
the kind of hierarchical structure against which the question of what is 
fundamental makes sense.”24 But is the assumption of the well-foundedness 
of grounding relations analytic or synthetic? It clearly seems to be synthetic, 
since Schaffer notes that one could deny it by accepting either metaphysical 
coherentism or metaphysical infinitism, and he feels the need to argue 
against these positions. In fact, in support of his rejection of these positions, 
he notes: “There must be a ground of being. If one thing exists only in virtue 
of another, then there must be something from which the reality of the 
derivative entities ultimately derives.”25 Given this assumption, he goes on to
argue that the something from which the reality of the derivative entities 
derives must be the cosmos, and thus that monism is true.
However, Kant’s position can help us to think through Schaffer’s 
argument. For the justification that Schaffer provides for his assumption of 
the well-foundedness of the grounding relation, seems to be based on an 
analysis of the concept of something being derivative or grounded and thus 
seems to be analytic. (The existence of a derivative being entails the 
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existence of that from which it derives its existence.) And this seems to be 
similar to Kant’s idea that the existence of something conditioned entails the
existence of its condition, since that is true in virtue of what it means for 
something to be conditioned. But note that this result would conflict with 
Schaffer’s apparent admission that the assumption of well-foundedness is a 
synthetic claim.
But perhaps it was a mistake to interpret Schaffer’s assumption of well-
foundedness as a synthetic claim. If so, then it obviously must be analytic. 
Now one might think that this is actually a very welcome result for Schaffer. 
For in that case monism would be an analytic truth! However, Kant’s position
reveals that there are dangers lurking in these waters too. For as we have 
seen, even if the existence of something conditioned entails the existence of 
something unconditioned, it does not follow that we must be able to cognize 
what it is that is unconditioned, and that is true even if we cognize both the 
conditioned object and its real conditioning relation.26 What this analysis 
means for Schaffer’s argument is that even if there are metaphysical priority 
relations that, given the well-foundedness assumption, must have an 
ultimate ground, we have no reason to think that we can specify what the 
ultimate ground is. As Kant notes, if the series of conditions terminates, 
there is no guarantee that we can specify any of the intrinsic positive 
features of the thing in which it terminates. And if that is the case, it does 
not follow that the ultimate ground has to be the cosmos (on any ordinary 
understanding of that term). To see this, recall that Kant notes that it is just 
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as metaphysically possible that the series of conditions does not terminate, 
in which case the ultimate ground is an infinite series of beings. Now 
Schaffer could say that this infinite series of beings just is the cosmos, and 
thus declare victory for monism. But this declaration would be rather hollow, 
because even if we knew that the cosmos has priority over its parts, we 
would not actually know what it is that has priority over its parts, a single all-
encompassing entity or an infinite series of things.
Turning now to a different issue, it may also be useful to consider a 
Kantian perspective on the question of the unity of grounding relations. On 
the one hand, Kant would clearly side with those who think that, 
methodologically, one must investigate all of the relevant details of each 
particular grounding relation in constructing long arguments for each 
particular topic. His starting point is with the particular claims of traditional 
metaphysicians, whatever they are, and he then provides detailed analyses 
of the grounding relations they involve, in order to show that we cannot have
cognition of the unconditioned, or of what is ungrounded. There is no way of 
limiting in advance the scope of the claims that one would need to consider. 
And he would also be concerned about those who might focus on only one 
particular grounding relation and then either leave it at that or immediately 
generalize without having done all the work that is required to establish a 
more general conclusion. 
Though I cannot go into detail here, one hypothesis is that different 
participants in the debate about grounding are taking different relations as 
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their paradigm instance of grounding and then attempting to generalize, 
though perhaps without being able to capture all of the other cases without 
regimentation.27 For example, Schaffer seems to be concerned primarily with
the worldly cases of composition and partition. Paul Audi, by contrast, is 
attempting to provide an account of our various uses of the phrase “in virtue 
of”. Gideon Rosen, in contrast to both, is primarily interested in whether or 
not what is derivative is real. But note how different these interests are. 
These are certainly different topics, and while it is possible that one and the 
same grounding relation could be central to all of them, the seemingly 
persistent nature of the debate about grounding suggests that either 
different relations are involved in the different areas and some participants 
in the debate are talking past some others, or the move to generalize has 
not gone off as smoothly as one might have liked. In such a case, it can be 
worth stepping back from the details of the specific issue that one happens 
to be focusing on and looking at others that can then seem to be closely 
related.
At the same time, Kant would not be in favor of simply resting content 
with a plurality of specific analyses and long arguments. After having 
completed the arduous work of analyzing a wide range of grounding 
relations, he does generalize. What’s more, there are real benefits to be had 
from the generalizing move. One clear benefit is that it allows him to identify
in a principled way our cognitive limitations. It is one thing to establish that 
we cannot have cognition of simples, or freedom, or God’s existence, it is 
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quite another to establish that we can never cognize anything unconditioned,
for that says something general and principled about the finitude of our 
cognitive abilities. A second clear benefit, which runs along similar lines, is 
that the generalizing move allows Kant to see more clearly what principles of
explanation come with human reason, regardless of its particular subject 
matter. For by looking to what all the particular cases have in common, he 
can establish not only that our explanations tend in the direction of God, the 
soul, and the world as a totality, but also that reason demands complete 
explanations in terms of what is unconditioned, and that says something 
general and principled about the unlimited ambitions that we take to our 
attempts to cognize the world. And it is in taking these two points together 
that allows Kant to identify a fundamental mismatch between the scope of 
reason’s demands and the limits of our cognition, a mismatch that can affect
the aspirations and practice of metaphysicians, both traditional and 
contemporary. 
This mismatch is crucial insofar as it allows him, and those who would 
heed his advice, to see two fundamental truths. First, that reason “is 
burdened with questions that it cannot dismiss, since they are given to it as 
problems by the nature of reason itself, but which it also cannot answer, 
since they transcend every capacity of human reason” (Avii). Second, it 
allows us to hope that our future discussions no longer resemble the 
battlefields of the past, where “[b]oth parties fence in the air and wrestle 
with their shadows, for they go beyond nature, where there is nothing that 
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their dogmatic grasp can seize and hold. Fight as they may, the shadows 
that they cleave apart grow back together in an instant, like the heroes of 
Valhalla, to amuse themselves anew in bloodless battles” (A754/B784).28
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